Polity Set 188
π
π Fundamental Rights β’ Property Rights
Q.1) The “Right to Property,” originally guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, was deleted from the list of Fundamental Rights by the 44th Amendment Act. It is now a constitutional right under which Article?
Ans > Article 300A
- The Original Position: At the commencement of the Constitution in 1950, the Right to Property was a Fundamental Right under Part III. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, while Article 31 protected individuals against state deprivation.
- Conflict and Litigation: The inclusion of property as a Fundamental Right created massive hurdles for the Indian government in implementing agrarian reforms, land redistribution, and the nationalization of key industries. It led to a continuous tug-of-war between the legislature and the judiciary, resulting in several constitutional amendments.
- The 44th Amendment Act (1978): Enacted by the Janata Party government, this amendment decisively resolved the conflict by deleting Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. It created a new Article 300A, which states, “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law,” officially demoting it to a legal or constitutional right.
π Constitution β’ Parts
Q.2) Article 300A falls under which Part of the Constitution?
Ans > Part XII
- Structure of Part XII: Part XII of the Indian Constitution is titled “Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits.” It spans from Article 264 to Article 300A, primarily dealing with the distribution of revenues between the Union and the States, the appointment of the Finance Commission, and the borrowing powers of the government.
- Placement of Article 300A: When the 44th Amendment Act removed the right to property from Part III (Fundamental Rights), lawmakers needed an appropriate place for it to reside as a standard constitutional right. Part XII was chosen because it already dealt with state property, contracts, and financial obligations.
- Significance of the Relocation: Placing the right here means that while the state cannot arbitrarily seize your property (it must pass a valid law to do so), the property owner no longer enjoys the heightened shield of Part III, significantly streamlining the government’s ability to acquire land for public infrastructure.
π Legal Concepts β’ Enforcement
Q.3) What is the fundamental legal difference between a Fundamental Right (Part III) and a Constitutional Right like the Right to Property (Article 300A)?
Ans > Violation of a Fundamental Right allows a citizen to directly approach the Supreme Court under Article 32, whereas violation of a Constitutional Right does not.
- Enforcement Mechanisms: The most crucial distinction lies in judicial enforceability. Part III of the Constitution grants citizens the extraordinary remedy of moving directly to the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. This direct access is itself a guaranteed Fundamental Right.
- Remedies for Constitutional Rights: For rights located outside Part III, such as Article 300A, this direct constitutional remedy is entirely unavailable. An aggrieved individual must either file a regular civil suit in a lower court or approach the High Court under Article 226 using its wider writ jurisdiction.
- Protection Against State Action: While a Fundamental Right generally protects individuals from arbitrary legislative action and cannot be easily abridged without a constitutional amendment, a mere constitutional right like property can be regulated, modified, or taken away by the state simply by passing an ordinary law, provided the law is procedurally valid.
π Amendments β’ Schedules
Q.4) The 1st Amendment Act (1951) added the Ninth Schedule to protect certain laws from judicial review. It also added which Article specifically to save laws providing for the acquisition of estates and agrarian reforms from being challenged on the grounds of violating Articles 14 and 19?
Ans > Article 31A
- The Need for Agrarian Reform: Following independence, abolishing the Zamindari system and redistributing land to landless farmers was a top priority for the Nehru government. However, wealthy landowners continuously challenged these reform laws in court, arguing they violated their Fundamental Rights to equality (Article 14) and property (Article 19).
- Introduction of Article 31A: To stop the courts from striking down land reform legislation, the 1st Amendment Act of 1951 introduced Article 31A. This article explicitly stated that laws dealing with the acquisition of “estates” (large landholdings) by the state could not be declared void on the grounds that they violated Articles 14 or 19.
- Judicial Shielding: Alongside Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule, Article 31A acted as a constitutional shield. It ensured that the socio-economic goals of the Directive Principles could be practically implemented without being stalled by endless litigation from dispossessed landlords.
π DPSP β’ Fundamental Rights
Q.5) Article 31C, added by the 25th Amendment Act (1971), gave primacy to certain Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights. It stated that no law seeking to implement the directives contained in Article 39(b) or (c) shall be void on the ground of contravention of the rights conferred by:
Ans > Articles 14 and 19
- The Socialist Push: In the early 1970s, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government aggressively pursued socialist policies, including bank nationalization and the abolition of privy purses. When the Supreme Court struck down these moves, Parliament enacted the 25th Amendment in 1971 to assert legislative supremacy.
- The Mechanics of Article 31C: Article 31C was revolutionary because it explicitly elevated specific Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) above Fundamental Rights. It stated that any law giving effect to Article 39(b) (equitable distribution of material resources) and Article 39(c) (prevention of concentration of wealth) could not be challenged for violating the rights to equality (Article 14) and freedom (Article 19).
- Impact on the Constitution: This marked a significant shift in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. Prior to this, Fundamental Rights were largely considered sacrosanct and supreme over DPSPs. Article 31C created a narrow but powerful constitutional corridor where the state’s socialist goals could legally override individual liberties.
π Supreme Court β’ Judgments
Q.6) The 42nd Amendment Act (1976) attempted to widen the scope of Article 31C by extending its protection to all Directive Principles, not just Article 39(b) and (c). The Supreme Court struck down this extension in the landmark case of:
Ans > Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
- The Emergency Era Overreach: During the National Emergency, the government passed the 42nd Amendment Act (1976), often called the “Mini-Constitution.” One of its most aggressive moves was expanding Article 31C to state that laws implementing any Directive Principle (Part IV) could override Articles 14 and 19, essentially subordinating individual rights to state policy across the board.
- The Minerva Mills Dispute: A textile mill in Karnataka, Minerva Mills, was nationalized by the government. The owners challenged the constitutionality of the laws that allowed this takeover, which inevitably led the Supreme Court to examine the sweeping changes made to Article 31C by the 42nd Amendment.
- The Judicial Pushback: In 1980, the Supreme Court struck down the expanded portion of Article 31C. The Court ruled that giving absolute primacy to all Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights destroyed the “basic structure” of the Constitution, successfully restoring the original, narrower scope of Article 31C (limited only to 39b and 39c).
π Basic Structure β’ Judiciary
Q.7) In the Minerva Mills case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between:
Ans > Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
- The Bedrock Theory: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, delivering the majority opinion in the Minerva Mills case, famously articulated that the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy).
- The Chariot Metaphor: The Court eloquently compared Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles to the two wheels of a chariot, stating that neither is superior to the other. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony is an essential feature of the basic structure doctrine.
- Resolving the Conflict: This judgment definitively ended decades of ideological conflict between Parliament and the Judiciary. It clarified that while the state must strive to achieve the socio-economic welfare goals laid out in the DPSPs, it must do so without systematically dismantling the core individual liberties guaranteed by Fundamental Rights.
π Armed Forces β’ Fundamental Rights
Q.8) Article 33 empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of the members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies. Does a State Legislature have the power to make laws under Article 33 for the state police forces?
Ans > No, the power to make laws under Article 33 is conferred exclusively on Parliament.
- Exclusive Parliamentary Domain: Even though ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ fall under the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Article 33 explicitly reserves the power to restrict Fundamental Rights of armed and police forces exclusively for the Parliament of India. State legislatures possess absolutely no power to enact laws under this Article.
- Rationale for the Restriction: The primary objective of Article 33 is to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance of absolute discipline among the forces. If police or armed forces had unrestricted Fundamental Rights, they could form political unions, strike, or protest, which would cripple the state’s security apparatus.
- Legislative Execution: Using this power, Parliament has enacted several acts, such as the Army Act (1950), the Navy Act (1957), and the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act (1966). These laws restrict military and police personnel from communicating with the press, attending political meetings, or forming trade unions.
π Emergency Provisions β’ Martial Law
Q.9) Article 34 places restrictions on Fundamental Rights while Martial Law is in force in any area. Which of the following is a key difference between Martial Law (Article 34) and a National Emergency (Article 352)?
Ans > Martial Law affects only Fundamental Rights, while Emergency affects Centre-State relations, revenues, and legislative powers as well.
- Scope of Impact: The most profound difference lies in their administrative scope. Martial Law (Article 34) is highly localized and only affects Fundamental Rights in a specific territory where the military has taken over to restore order. It does not alter the federal structure of the nation.
- Broad Reach of Article 352: A National Emergency, conversely, drastically transforms the entire constitutional machinery. It shifts the federal structure into a unitary one, allows Parliament to legislate on State List subjects, alters the distribution of financial revenues between the Centre and States, and extends the tenure of the Lok Sabha.
- Trigger Conditions: National Emergency is declared on specific grounds of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Martial Law has no specific grounds laid out in the Constitution; it is generally imposed to counter severe internal disturbances, riots, or insurrections where ordinary civil administration has completely collapsed.
π Definitions β’ Martial Law
Q.10) Is the term “Martial Law” explicitly defined in the Constitution of India?
Ans > No, it has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution.
- Implicit Borrowing: The Indian Constitution refers to Martial Law in Article 34, but it deliberately refrains from defining the term. The concept is implicitly borrowed from English common law, where it signifies the suspension of ordinary law and the substitution of military rule due to the breakdown of civil authority.
- Characteristics of Martial Law: Because it is undefined, legal scholars interpret Martial Law as a state of extreme necessity where military commanders are empowered to take any action necessary to restore order, including establishing military tribunals, punishing civilians, and suspending all civil liberties, including the right to habeas corpus.
- Parliamentary Indemnification: Article 34 specifically empowers Parliament to indemnify (protect from legal consequences) any government servant or military personnel for acts done in connection with the maintenance or restoration of order in an area where Martial Law was in force, thereby legalizing actions that would otherwise be highly unconstitutional.
π Fundamental Duties β’ Committees
Q.11) The Fundamental Duties (Article 51A) were added by the 42nd Amendment Act (1976) on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee. Which of the following recommendations of the Swaran Singh Committee was NOT accepted by the government?
Ans > All of the above
- The Swaran Singh Committee: Formed during the 1975-1977 National Emergency by the Indira Gandhi government, the Sardar Swaran Singh Committee was tasked with making recommendations about fundamental duties and obligations of citizens, a concept inspired by the Constitution of the USSR.
- Rejected Punitive Measures: The committee suggested a hardline approach, recommending that Parliament should have the power to impose financial penalties or imprisonment for citizens who failed to uphold these duties. Furthermore, they recommended that any law imposing such a penalty should be completely immune from judicial review.
- Government’s Dilution: The Congress government rejected these harsh punitive measures. They also rejected the committee’s suggestion to include the “duty to pay taxes” as a Fundamental Duty. As a result, the Fundamental Duties enshrined in Article 51A are purely moral and civic obligations, non-justiciable in nature, and carry no direct legal sanctions for their violation.
π Executive β’ Vice-President
Q.12) Who was the first Vice-President of India to be elected unopposed?
Ans > Dr. S. Radhakrishnan
- A Towering Intellectual: Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was an internationally renowned philosopher, scholar, and statesman. His immense stature and universal respect across party lines made him the natural consensus candidate for India’s first Vice-Presidential election in 1952.
- Double Unopposed Terms: He holds the unique distinction of being elected unopposed not just once, but twice. After serving his first term, he was elected without any opposition again in 1957, serving as Vice-President for a full decade before eventually succeeding Dr. Rajendra Prasad as the President of India in 1962.
- Historical Precedent: While Dr. Radhakrishnan was the first, he was not the last. Justice M. Hidayatullah (1979) and Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma (1987) were also later elected to the office of the Vice-President without facing a contest, showcasing moments of rare political unanimity in Indian parliamentary history.
π Executive β’ President
Q.13) Who is the only President of India to have been elected unopposed?
Ans > Neelam Sanjiva Reddy
- The 1977 Political Landscape: The 1977 Presidential election took place immediately following the lifting of the controversial National Emergency. The Janata Party had just swept the general elections, handing the Indian National Congress its first-ever defeat at the national level. The political atmosphere was heavily skewed against the Congress.
- Redemption for Reddy: Neelam Sanjiva Reddy had previously run for the Presidency in 1969 as the official Congress candidate but lost due to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi famously backing the independent candidate, V.V. Giri, in a “conscience vote.” His unopposed election in 1977 was seen as a historical vindication.
- Rejection of Nominations: Reddy was elected unopposed not merely by political consensus, but also due to technicalities. A total of 37 candidates filed their nomination papers for the 1977 election, but the Returning Officer rejected 36 of them for failing to meet the strict constitutional and statutory requirements, leaving Reddy as the sole valid candidate.
π Elections β’ President
Q.14) In the history of Indian Presidential elections, which election saw the use of the “second preference votes” because no candidate secured the required quota in the first count?
Ans > 1969 election of V.V. Giri
- The System of Proportional Representation: The President of India is elected using the single transferable vote system. To win, a candidate must secure an absolute quota (50% + 1 vote). If no one reaches this in the first count of “first preference” votes, the candidate with the lowest votes is eliminated, and their “second preference” votes are distributed among the remaining candidates.
- The 1969 Congress Split: The 1969 election was highly dramatic. Following the death of President Zakir Hussain, the Congress party’s “Syndicate” (old guard) nominated Neelam Sanjiva Reddy. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rebelled, encouraging her supporters to vote for the independent candidate, V.V. Giri, based on a “conscience vote.”
- The Historic Count: Because of the split in Congress votes and the presence of a strong third candidate (C.D. Deshmukh), neither Giri nor Reddy secured the required 50% quota in the first round of counting. The second preference votes of Deshmukh’s supporters had to be counted, which eventually pushed V.V. Giri past the quota, making it the only time in Indian history this mechanism was required.
π Elections β’ Disputes
Q.15) Article 71 states that all doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired into and decided by the:
Ans > Supreme Court
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: To prevent political interference and ensure the highest level of judicial scrutiny for the top two constitutional offices in the country, Article 71 vests the exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear election disputes regarding the President and Vice-President in the Supreme Court of India.
- Bypassing the ECI: While the Election Commission of India (ECI) is responsible for conducting these elections, it does not have the authority to resolve post-election disputes regarding them. This is distinct from disputes regarding Members of Parliament or State Legislatures, which begin with election petitions in the High Courts.
- Finality of the Verdict: Article 71 explicitly states that the decision of the Supreme Court shall be final. If the Supreme Court declares the election of a President void, the acts done by the President in the exercise of their official duties prior to the date of the Supreme Courtβs decision are not invalidated.
π Elections β’ Electoral College
Q.16) Article 71(4) clarifies that the election of a person as President or Vice-President shall not be called in question on the ground of any vacancy in the:
Ans > Electoral College
- The Electoral College Composition: The President is elected by an Electoral College consisting of the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States (and the UTs of Delhi and Puducherry). This involves thousands of lawmakers.
- The Problem of Dissolved Assemblies: State assemblies are frequently dissolved prematurely due to political instability or the imposition of President’s Rule. If the Presidential election could be halted or challenged because a few State Assemblies were dissolved, the office of the President could remain dangerously vacant.
- Constitutional Safeguard: To prevent such constitutional crises, the 11th Amendment Act (1961) amended Article 71 to categorically state that a vacancy in the Electoral College (whether due to a dissolved assembly or vacant MP/MLA seats) cannot be used as a ground to challenge or delay the election of the President or Vice-President.
π Finance β’ Funds
Q.17) The salary and allowances of the President of India are charged upon the:
Ans > Consolidated Fund of India
- Understanding the Consolidated Fund: The Consolidated Fund of India (Article 266) is the chief account of the Government of India. All revenues received by the government, loans raised, and money received in repayment of loans flow into this massive central fund.
- “Charged Upon” Meaning: When an expenditure is “charged upon” the Consolidated Fund, it means that the expense is non-votable. While Parliament can discuss these expenses, they do not need to be submitted to the Lok Sabha for an annual vote of approval during the budget process.
- Safeguarding Independence: This financial mechanism is a constitutional safeguard designed to ensure the independence of high constitutional offices. By charging the salaries of the President, Supreme Court Judges, and the CAG directly to the Consolidated Fund, the Constitution ensures that the legislature cannot use financial pressure to influence these officials.
π Executive β’ Oath
Q.18) The oath of office to the President is administered by the Chief Justice of India. In their absence, who administers the oath?
Ans > The senior-most judge of the Supreme Court available
- The Constitutional Mandate: Article 60 of the Constitution mandates that every President, or person acting as President, must take an oath or affirmation before entering office. The oath requires them to faithfully execute the office and to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law.”
- Judicial Administration: The Constitution designates the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to administer this crucial oath, symbolizing the role of the judiciary as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution. The oath physically connects the head of the executive with the head of the judiciary.
- The Line of Succession: If the CJI is absent due to illness, travel, or vacancy in the office, the responsibility automatically falls to the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court who is available. This ensures that the constitutional machinery is never stalled by the absence of a single individual.
π Executive β’ Impeachment
Q.19) Article 61 details the procedure for the impeachment of the President. The only ground for impeachment mentioned in the Constitution is:
Ans > Violation of the Constitution
- A Singular Ground: Unlike Judges of the Supreme Court or the Election Commissioners, who can be removed for “proved misbehavior or incapacity,” the President of India can be impeached on one, and only one, ground: “Violation of the Constitution.”
- Ambiguity of the Term: Interestingly, the Constitution does not define what actually constitutes a “Violation of the Constitution.” It is a broad, subjective phrase left entirely to the interpretation of the Parliament during the impeachment proceedings, giving it a highly political rather than purely legal flavor.
- Deterrent Mechanism: Because the President functions primarily on the binding advice of the Council of Ministers, a direct violation of the Constitution by the President would likely involve a rogue action, such as refusing to step down, dismissing a government with a clear majority, or bypassing Parliament. Impeachment serves as the ultimate democratic deterrent against executive tyranny.
π Parliament β’ Special Majority
Q.20) An impeachment motion against the President requires a very strict “Special Majority”. It must be passed by:
Ans > Not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House
- The Highest Hurdle: The majority required to impeach the President under Article 61 is the most stringent form of special majority found anywhere in the Indian Constitution. It requires the backing of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House, regardless of vacancies or absences.
- Comparison with Amendments: For a standard constitutional amendment under Article 368, the requirement is a majority of the total membership and two-thirds of members “present and voting.” The impeachment criteria is significantly harder because it calculates the two-thirds based on the absolute maximum strength of the House.
- Ensuring Broad Consensus: This incredibly high numerical threshold ensures that a President cannot be removed for frivolous, partisan, or purely political reasons. An impeachment would only succeed if there is overwhelming, cross-party, near-universal agreement in both Houses of Parliament that a grave violation has occurred.
π Parliament β’ Impeachment
Q.21) Do the nominated members of either House of Parliament participate in the impeachment of the President?
Ans > Yes
- The Election Anomaly: Under Article 54, the Electoral College that elects the President consists strictly of elected members of Parliament and State Assemblies. Nominated members (such as the 12 members nominated to the Rajya Sabha for their expertise in arts, science, etc.) are explicitly barred from voting in the Presidential election.
- The Impeachment Inclusion: However, when it comes to the impeachment process outlined in Article 61, the Constitution states that the resolution must be passed by the Houses of Parliament. In this legislative capacity, the nominated members possess full voting rights and therefore participate in the removal of the President.
- The Rationale: The logic behind this discrepancy is that nominated members owe their appointment directly to the President (acting on the advice of the government). Allowing them to elect the President could create a conflict of interest or a “vote bank,” but barring them from the legislative act of impeachment would undermine their status as full members of Parliament.
π State Legislatures β’ Impeachment
Q.22) Do the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of States and Union Territories (Delhi and Puducherry) participate in the impeachment of the President?
Ans > No
- Role in Election: Elected Members of the Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) across all states and specific Union Territories form a massive and crucial block in the Electoral College that elects the President. Their votes are weighted based on the population of their respective states to ensure federal representation.
- Exclusion from Impeachment: Despite their vital role in electing the Head of State, MLAs have absolutely no role in the impeachment process. Article 61 confines the entire impeachment mechanismβboth the framing of charges and the final votingβexclusively to the two Houses of the Union Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha).
- Federal Imbalance Controversy: Constitutional experts frequently point out this structural asymmetry. The states have a significant say in putting the President in office but are completely powerless to remove them or protect them from removal, underscoring the unitary bias of the Indian federal structure during constitutional crises.
π Executive β’ Council of Ministers
Q.23) Under Article 74(1), there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. The 44th Amendment Act added a proviso stating that the President may require the Council of Ministers to:
Ans > Reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise
- The 42nd Amendment Rigidity: During the Emergency, Indira Gandhi’s 42nd Amendment rigidly altered Article 74(1) to explicitly state that the President “shall” act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers, stripping the President of all discretionary leverage and reducing the office to a pure rubber stamp.
- The 44th Amendment Nuance: When the Janata Party came to power, they sought to restore some dignity to the President’s office without altering the fundamental parliamentary system. The 44th Amendment (1978) introduced a crucial proviso allowing the President to send the advice back to the Cabinet for reconsideration.
- The Binding Second Advice: The catch is that this power of reconsideration can only be used once per issue. If the Council of Ministers re-sends the exact same advice (with or without changes) back to the President, the Constitution explicitly states that the President is bound to sign it, acting as a constitutional check rather than a veto.
π Executive β’ Cabinet Secrecy
Q.24) Article 74(2) states that the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall:
Ans > Not be inquired into in any court
- Cabinet Confidentiality: The foundation of the parliamentary system rests on the principle of collective responsibility and cabinet secrecy. Article 74(2) serves as an absolute legal shield, preventing the judiciary from peering into the communication between the executive government and the Head of State.
- Preventing Judicial Overreach: By barring courts from inquiring into what advice was given (or if any was given at all), the Constitution ensures that the day-to-day administrative and political decisions of the government cannot be stalled by constant litigation questioning the nature of the Prime Minister’s recommendations to the President.
- Supreme Court Interpretation: In cases like S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the Supreme Court clarified that while the actual “advice” is beyond judicial scrutiny, the “material” upon which that advice was based (e.g., reports from a Governor leading to the imposition of President’s Rule) can be examined by the courts to check for mala fide intent.
π Executive β’ Ministerial Tenure
Q.25) Article 75(2) states that the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. Does this mean the President can dismiss a Minister at will?
Ans > No, the President exercises this power only on the advice of the Prime Minister.
- The Concept of “Pleasure”: The phrase “pleasure of the President” is inherited from British constitutional law (“pleasure of the Crown”). In theory, it suggests the Head of State has the absolute right to hire and fire ministers.
- The Reality of Parliamentary Democracy: In practice, under the Indian constitutional scheme (governed by Article 74), the President’s “pleasure” is entirely subsumed by the Prime Minister’s prerogative. The President cannot unilaterally decide to dismiss a Minister they dislike.
- The Prime Minister’s Prerogative: This provision effectively gives the Prime Minister supreme control over their cabinet. If a Minister disagrees with the cabinet’s decisions or loses the PM’s confidence, the PM can ask them to resign. If they refuse, the PM advises the President to dismiss them, and the President is constitutionally bound to comply.
π Parliamentary System β’ Collective Responsibility
Q.26) Article 75(3) establishes the bedrock of the parliamentary system by stating that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the:
Ans > House of the People (Lok Sabha)
- The Core of Democracy: Article 75(3) is arguably the most vital operational clause for India’s democratic machinery. It establishes that the executive branch derives its legitimacy and right to govern exclusively from maintaining the confidence of the directly elected lower house, the Lok Sabha.
- Excluding the Rajya Sabha: The Council of Ministers is not responsible to the Rajya Sabha. Even if the government is heavily defeated on a crucial bill in the Upper House, it is not obligated to resign. Only a defeat in the Lok Sabha necessitates resignation.
- The Mechanism of Control: This collective responsibility is enforced through various parliamentary tools, the ultimate weapon being the “No-Confidence Motion.” If a no-confidence motion is passed by a simple majority in the Lok Sabha, the entire government collapses instantly, proving that the executive is subordinate to the popular legislature.
π Executive β’ No-Confidence Motion
Q.27) The principle of “Collective Responsibility” implies that if a no-confidence motion is passed in the Lok Sabha against the Council of Ministers:
Ans > All Ministers, including those from the Rajya Sabha, must resign
- Swimming and Sinking Together: The doctrine of collective responsibility means that all cabinet decisions are joint decisions. Once a policy is decided in the cabinet room, every minister is politically and morally bound to support it in public and in Parliament, regardless of their personal objections.
- The Domino Effect of Defeat: Because the government acts as a single, indivisible entity, a vote of no-confidence against one minister or the government as a whole is a defeat for the entire administration. There is no such thing as removing a single minister via a no-confidence motion.
- Rajya Sabha Ministers: This rule applies strictly across the board. Even if a minister is a member of the Rajya Sabha (and thus had no vote in the Lok Sabha proceedings), the passage of a no-confidence motion in the Lok Sabha mandates their immediate resignation along with the Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet.
π Executive β’ Prime Minister
Q.28) Article 75(5) states that a Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that a person who is not a member of either House CAN be appointed as Prime Minister for six months. In which case was this ruled?
Ans > S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda
- The Non-Member Loophole: Article 75(5) provides a grace period, allowing the Prime Minister to induct experts or politically crucial individuals into the cabinet even if they haven’t won an election, provided they secure a seat in the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha within six months.
- The Deve Gowda Precedent: In 1996, the United Front coalition chose H.D. Deve Gowda as their consensus candidate for Prime Minister. At the time, Gowda was the Chief Minister of Karnataka and a member of the state legislature, not a Member of Parliament.
- The Supreme Court’s Validation: His appointment was challenged in the Supreme Court by S.P. Anand. The Court upheld the appointment, ruling that the term “Minister” in Article 75(5) encompasses the “Prime Minister.” The Court affirmed that an unelected individual can hold the highest executive office for six months, provided they command the confidence of the Lok Sabha and get elected to Parliament within that timeframe.
π Amendments β’ Council of Ministers
Q.29) The total number of Ministers in the Council of Ministers must not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha. Which Constitutional Amendment introduced this cap?
Ans > 91st Amendment Act (2003)
- The Era of Jumbo Cabinets: Before 2003, there was no constitutional limit on the size of the Council of Ministers. During the era of unstable coalition governments in the 1990s, Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers began creating massive “jumbo cabinets” to appease rebel MLAs and allied parties, resulting in massive drains on the public exchequer.
- The 91st Amendment Solution: To curb this rampant political corruption and excessive state expenditure, the Vajpayee government passed the 91st Amendment Act in 2003. It inserted Article 75(1A), setting a hard ceiling on the cabinet size at 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.
- Application to States: This amendment also applied identically to state legislatures via Article 164(1A), restricting state cabinets to 15% of the Legislative Assembly’s strength, with a caveat that a state must have a minimum of 12 ministers to ensure smooth administration in smaller states like Goa or Sikkim.
π Parliament β’ Salaries
Q.30) Finally, who decides the salaries and allowances of the Ministers (including the Prime Minister)?
Ans > The Parliament from time to time by law
- Legislative Control of Finances: Under Article 75(6) of the Constitution, the power to determine the salaries, allowances, pensions, and perks of all Union Ministers (which includes the Prime Minister) is vested entirely in the Parliament of India.
- The Statutory Mechanism: Parliament exercises this power by passing regular legislation, specifically the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952. Whenever a pay revision is deemed necessary due to inflation or changing economic conditions, Parliament must pass an amendment to this specific Act.
- Accountability and Transparency: This ensures that the executive branch cannot unilaterally hike its own pay secretly or arbitrarily. Any increase in ministerial salaries requires a bill to be tabled, debated, and voted upon in both Houses of Parliament, ensuring complete public transparency and democratic accountability for taxpayer money.
π Quick Summary β Polity Set 188
- Right to Property: Moved from Fundamental Rights to Article 300A by the 44th Amendment Act.
- Article 300A Part: It now resides in Part XII of the Constitution.
- Legal Enforcement: Violation of a Constitutional Right cannot be directly taken to the SC under Article 32.
- Article 31A: Added by the 1st Amendment to protect agrarian reforms from Articles 14 and 19.
- Article 31C: Added by the 25th Amendment giving DPSP (Art 39b/c) primacy over Articles 14 & 19.
- Minerva Mills Case: Struck down the extension of Article 31C by the 42nd Amendment Act.
- Basic Structure Bedrock: Minerva Mills affirmed the balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSP.
- Article 33 Restriction: Only Parliament can restrict the Fundamental Rights of Armed Forces.
- Martial Law vs Emergency: Martial Law solely affects Fundamental Rights; Emergency affects entire relations.
- Martial Law Definition: “Martial Law” is not explicitly defined anywhere in the Constitution.
- Fundamental Duties: Swaran Singh Committee’s recommendations on penalties and taxes were rejected.
- First Unopposed VP: Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was elected unopposed twice.
- Unopposed President: Neelam Sanjiva Reddy is the only President elected unopposed (1977).
- Second Preference Votes: Used only once in history, during the 1969 election of V.V. Giri.
- Election Disputes: Article 71 vests the Supreme Court with resolving Presidential election disputes.
- Electoral College Vacancy: A vacancy cannot be a ground to challenge the President’s election (11th Amendment).
- President’s Salary: Charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India to ensure independence.
- President’s Oath: Administered by the Chief Justice, or the senior-most available SC judge.
- Impeachment Ground: “Violation of the Constitution” is the only ground mentioned in Article 61.
- Impeachment Majority: Requires not less than 2/3rds of the total membership of the House.
- Nominated Members: Participate in the impeachment of the President, though not in the election.
- State MLAs: Do not participate in the impeachment of the President.
- Reconsideration Power: 44th Amendment allowed the President to return advice to the Cabinet once.
- Cabinet Advice Secrecy: Article 74(2) bars courts from inquiring into advice tendered to the President.
- Dismissal of Ministers: The President dismisses ministers only on the Prime Minister’s advice.
- Collective Responsibility: Under Article 75(3), the Council is responsible to the Lok Sabha.
- No-Confidence Resignation: Passing the motion forces all Ministers (even from Rajya Sabha) to resign.
- Non-Member PM: S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda validated appointing a non-MP as PM for six months.
- Cabinet Size Cap: 91st Amendment limited Ministers to 15% of Lok Sabha’s strength.
- Ministerial Salaries: Determined by Parliament from time to time by law.
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