Polity Set 196
π
π Center-State Relations β’ Article 263
Q.1) Article 263 empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to effect coordination between states and the Centre. On whose recommendation was the Inter-State Council formally established in 1990?
Ans > Sarkaria Commission
- Constitutional Provision (Article 263): The Constitution of India under Article 263 envisions the establishment of an Inter-State Council to foster cooperative federalism. It empowers the President to set up this council if it appears that public interest would be served. Despite being a constitutional provision since 1950, the council was not formed for four decades, relying instead on ad-hoc bodies.
- The Sarkaria Commission’s Role: In 1983, the Central Government appointed the Sarkaria Commission, headed by Justice R.S. Sarkaria, to review center-state relations. In its 1988 report, the commission strongly recommended establishing a permanent Inter-State Council as an independent national forum for consultation.
- Formation in 1990: Acting upon the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations, the V.P. Singh-led Janata Dal government formally established the Inter-State Council through a Presidential Order on May 28, 1990. This landmark step institutionalized center-state dialogue, providing a structured platform to investigate common interests and make recommendations for better policy coordination.
π Center-State Relations β’ Executive
Q.2) Who acts as the Chairman of the Inter-State Council?
Ans > The Prime Minister
- Executive Leadership: The Inter-State Council is a pivotal body in India’s federal structure, and its composition reflects this high-level importance. It is chaired by the Prime Minister of India, which gives the Council the necessary political weight and executive authority to effectively mediate complex disputes and forge national consensus on contentious policies.
- Comprehensive Membership: Under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, the members include the Chief Ministers of all states and Union Territories with a Legislative Assembly, alongside Administrators of UTs without an assembly. Furthermore, six Union Cabinet Ministers (including the Home Minister) are nominated by the Prime Minister to serve on the council.
- Distinction from the Standing Committee: While the Prime Minister acts as the Chairman of the apex Inter-State Council, it is crucial to note that the Standing Committee of the Inter-State Councilβwhich handles continuous consultations and processes matters for the main council’s considerationβis chaired by the Union Home Minister, ensuring ongoing administrative continuity.
π Minorities β’ Article 350B
Q.3) Article 350B provides for a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. Who appoints this Special Officer?
Ans > The President of India
- Origin of the Provision: The original Constitution of India did not contain any provision for a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. This provision was added as Article 350B by the 7th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1956, based on the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission (1953-55), to safeguard the rights of linguistic minority groups during state reorganization.
- Appointment and Reporting: Under Article 350B, the President of India is explicitly empowered to appoint the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. It is the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under the Constitution and report directly to the President at such intervals as the President may direct.
- Parliamentary Scrutiny: Once the Special Officer submits these reports to the President, the President is constitutionally mandated to cause all such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament. The reports are also sent to the governments of the respective states to ensure accountability and corrective action at the state level.
π Constitutional Bodies β’ Amendments
Q.4) The 102nd Constitutional Amendment Act (2018) inserted Article 338B, granting constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC). How many members does the NCBC have, including the Chairperson?
Ans > 5
- Evolution to Constitutional Status: Initially, the National Commission for Backward Classes was a statutory body established under the NCBC Act of 1993, following the Supreme Court’s mandate in the Mandal case (Indra Sawhney). The 102nd Constitutional Amendment Act in 2018 elevated it by inserting Article 338B, granting it constitutional status on par with the National Commissions for SCs and STs.
- Composition Details: The Constitution specifies that the NCBC shall consist of exactly five members: a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson, and three other Members. This multi-member composition ensures diverse representation and expertise when investigating the grievances and welfare measures pertaining to socially and educationally backward classes.
- Conditions of Service: The conditions of service and tenure of office of the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, and other Members are not fixed by the Constitution itself. Instead, Article 338B empowers the President of India to determine these rules. Currently, they are appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal, and typically hold office for a term of three years.
π Parliament β’ Financial Procedure
Q.5) In parliamentary financial procedure, what does the “Rule of Lapse” signify?
Ans > All unspent funds granted by Parliament for a specific financial year lapse at the end of that financial year and return to the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Mechanism of Financial Control: The “Rule of Lapse” is a fundamental principle of public finance in India designed to ensure strict parliamentary control over the executive’s expenditure. When Parliament grants funds to the government through the Appropriation Act, those funds are strictly meant to be utilized within that specific financial year (April 1 to March 31).
- Return to the Consolidated Fund: If a ministry or department fails to spend the allocated money by the end of the financial year on March 31st, the remaining unspent balance automatically expires or “lapses.” This unspent money cannot be carried forward to the next financial year; it reverts directly to the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Consequences and the “March Rush”: Because unspent funds lapse, government departments often panic toward the end of the financial year. This leads to a phenomenon known as the “March Rush,” where departments aggressively spend remaining funds in March to avoid returning them, which can sometimes result in inefficient or wasteful public expenditure.
π Parliament β’ Committees
Q.6) To bypass the strict “Rule of Lapse” and prevent a rush of expenditure in March (March Rush), government departments sometimes transfer unspent funds to a special account. What is the constitutional/legal view of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) on this practice?
Ans > It is considered an irregular practice that undermines parliamentary financial control.
- The PAC’s Watchdog Role: The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is a powerful parliamentary committee responsible for auditing the revenue and expenditure of the Government of India. Its primary role is to ensure that public money is spent exactly as Parliament intended, strictly adhering to the scopes and timelines of the budgetary grants.
- Subversion of Parliamentary Authority: When government departments transfer unspent funds into special deposit accounts or personal ledger accounts just before March 31 to prevent the money from lapsing, the PAC views this as a severe circumvention of parliamentary authority. It essentially creates a secret reserve of funds outside of legislative scrutiny.
- Irregular Practice Declarations: The PAC has repeatedly condemned this “parking of funds” as a highly irregular and unconstitutional practice. It argues that by hiding unspent funds, the executive falsely inflates the expenditure for that year and bypasses the fundamental democratic principle that the legislature must authorize every single rupee spent by the executive branch.
π Executive β’ Collective Responsibility
Q.7) Which Article of the Constitution establishes the principle of “Collective Responsibility” of the Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha?
Ans > Article 75(3)
- Core of the Parliamentary System: Article 75(3) states that “The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People (Lok Sabha).” This single clause forms the bedrock of the parliamentary system of government in India, ensuring that the executive remains accountable to the directly elected representatives of the people.
- The Concept of Swimming and Sinking Together: Collective responsibility implies that the entire Council of Ministers functions as a single unified team. If the Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion against the government, all ministersβincluding those from the Rajya Sabhaβmust resign. They swim and sink together, and no minister can publicly disagree with a cabinet decision once it is made.
- Deterrence Against Autocracy: By anchoring the government’s survival to the majority support in the Lok Sabha, Article 75(3) acts as a powerful deterrent against executive autocracy. It forces the Prime Minister and the cabinet to constantly maintain the confidence of the lower house, ensuring responsive and responsible governance at all times.
π Executive β’ Individual Responsibility
Q.8) Article 75(2) establishes the principle of “Individual Responsibility” by stating that Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President. In practice, the President exercises this pleasure only on the advice of the:
Ans > Prime Minister
- Constitutional Doctrine of Pleasure: Article 75(2) embodies the principle of individual ministerial responsibility by stating that ministers hold office during the “pleasure of the President.” In a strict constitutional reading, it appears the President has the unilateral power to dismiss a minister.
- Real Executive Authority: However, India follows the Westminster model where the President is a nominal head. In actual political practice, the President can only exercise this “pleasure” on the specific advice of the Prime Minister. The President cannot independently dismiss a minister if the minister still enjoys the Prime Minister’s backing.
- Tool for Prime Ministerial Control: This provision effectively acts as the Prime Minister’s tool to maintain discipline within the cabinet. If a minister disagrees with cabinet decisions or performs poorly, the Prime Minister can ask for their resignation. If the minister refuses, the PM can advise the President to dismiss them, thereby ensuring unity and enforcing individual accountability.
π Parliament β’ Motions
Q.9) When a “Motion of Thanks” on the President’s Address is debated in Parliament, it must be passed in both Houses. What happens if the Motion of Thanks is defeated in the Lok Sabha?
Ans > It is considered a vote of no-confidence, and the government must resign.
- Nature of the President’s Address: Article 87 provides for the special address by the President at the commencement of the first session after each general election and the first session of each year. Crucially, the President does not write this address; it is drafted by the Council of Ministers and outlines the government’s policies and legislative agenda.
- The Motion of Thanks: After the address, both Houses debate the contents through a “Motion of Thanks.” Since the address is a direct statement of the government’s agenda, the debate provides an opportunity for the opposition to criticize the government for its past performance and future plans.
- Implications of Defeat: Because the address is the government’s policy statement, defeating the Motion of Thanks in the Lok Sabha implies that the government no longer commands a majority in the house. Consequently, a defeat of this motion is treated as tantamount to a vote of no-confidence, making it constitutionally mandatory for the government to resign immediately.
π Parliament β’ Motions & Privileges
Q.10) What is a “Privilege Motion” in the context of parliamentary proceedings?
Ans > A motion moved by a member when they feel a minister has committed a breach of privilege of the House by withholding facts or giving distorted facts.
- Parliamentary Privileges: Members of Parliament individually, and the Houses collectively, enjoy certain rights and immunities known as parliamentary privileges (Article 105). These privileges are essential to ensure the effective discharge of their legislative functions without fear, favor, or external obstruction.
- Breach of Privilege: If a minister is suspected of lying, withholding crucial information, presenting distorted facts, or misleading the Parliament during a debate or while answering a question, it is considered an insult to the dignity of the House and a direct breach of its collective privilege.
- Mechanism of the Motion: To hold the executive accountable, any member of the house can move a “Privilege Motion” against the errant minister. If the Presiding Officer admits the motion, it may be debated in the house or referred to the Privileges Committee. If found guilty, the minister faces censure or other penal actions dictated by the House.
π Parliament β’ Calling Attention
Q.11) A “Calling Attention Motion” is an Indian innovation in parliamentary procedure. Does it involve any censure against the government?
Ans > No, it does not involve any censure against the government; it merely seeks an authoritative statement on an urgent matter.
- Purpose of the Motion: Introduced in 1954, the Calling Attention Motion is a procedural device uniquely developed in India. It is used by a Member of Parliament to call the attention of a specific minister to a matter of urgent public importance, compelling the minister to address the issue promptly.
- Seeking Authoritative Statements: The primary utility of this motion is informational. It allows MPs to extract an authoritative, official factual statement from the government regarding a sudden crisis or urgent event, ensuring the public is accurately informed directly by the executive rather than through rumors.
- Lack of Censure Element: Unlike an Adjournment Motion or a No-Confidence Motion, the Calling Attention Motion is not a mechanism for censuring the government. It does not involve a vote that threatens the survival of the government. Its sole focus is transparency and immediate executive accountability regarding pressing public issues without implying legislative condemnation.
π Parliament β’ Zero Hour
Q.12) Which parliamentary device is strictly an Indian innovation, not found in the rules of procedure, and allows members to raise matters without any prior notice?
Ans > Zero Hour
- Origin and Nature: Zero Hour is an informal parliamentary device that is uniquely Indian; it is not mentioned in the official rules of parliamentary procedure. It spontaneously evolved in the early 1960s as a mechanism for Members of Parliament to raise extremely urgent issues without the mandatory prior notice required for other motions.
- Timing in the House: It is famously called “Zero Hour” because it typically begins at exactly 12:00 noon in both Houses, immediately following the Question Hour. It acts as the transitional time gap between the formal Question Hour and the commencement of the regular legislative agenda for the day.
- Unstructured Accountability: Because it lacks strict procedural rules, Zero Hour is highly dynamic and often chaotic. Members use this time to rapidly highlight pressing constituency issues, sudden national crises, or governmental lapses. While ministers are not technically obligated to reply immediately, the intense visibility of Zero Hour makes it a vital tool for democratic accountability.
π Center-State β’ Article 262
Q.13) Article 262 bars the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over inter-state river water disputes. Which statutory body was created by Parliament under this Article to adjudicate such disputes?
Ans > Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunals
- Exclusion of Court Jurisdiction: Recognizing the deeply political, economic, and emotional complexities of sharing river waters, the Constitution-makers drafted Article 262. This article explicitly permits Parliament to exclude the Supreme Court and all other courts from exercising jurisdiction over disputes relating to inter-state rivers and river valleys.
- Statutory Framework: To act on this constitutional authorization, Parliament enacted two laws in 1956: The River Boards Act and the Inter-State Water Disputes Act. The latter empowers the Central Government to establish ad-hoc, temporary Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunals whenever a state government requests one and negotiation fails.
- Binding Nature of Awards: Once an Inter-State Water Dispute Tribunal is constituted, it adjudicates the allocation of river water among the contesting states (e.g., the Cauvery or Krishna Water Disputes Tribunals). Crucially, the decision of the tribunal is final and binding on the disputing parties, holding the same legal force as an order of the Supreme Court.
π Center-State β’ Tribunals
Q.14) Who is empowered to appoint the Chairman and members of an Inter-State Water Dispute Tribunal?
Ans > The Chief Justice of India
- Maintaining Judicial Independence: Inter-state river disputes are highly contentious issues involving state governments and often the central government. To ensure absolute neutrality, fairness, and the absence of political bias, the power to appoint the adjudicators to these tribunals is deliberately kept away from the political executive.
- The Role of the Chief Justice: Under the provisions of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, it is the Chief Justice of India who is exclusively empowered to nominate the Chairman and the other members of a water dispute tribunal. This ensures the highest level of judicial credibility.
- Qualifications of Members: To guarantee legal expertise and authority, the Chief Justice does not appoint just anyone; the members and the Chairman are strictly nominated from among persons who are sitting judges of the Supreme Court of India or the High Courts. This rigorous selection elevates the tribunal’s status, compensating for the barred original jurisdiction of the regular courts.
π Local Government β’ Municipalities
Q.15) Under the Constitution (Article 243W), the State Legislature endows Municipalities with the power to function as institutions of local self-government. The 12th Schedule lists how many functional items for Municipalities?
Ans > 18
- The 74th Amendment Act: The 12th Schedule was introduced into the Indian Constitution by the landmark 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992. This amendment aimed to democratize and empower urban local bodies (Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils, and Nagar Panchayats), ensuring they operate as effective, self-sustaining institutions of local self-government.
- Scope of Functional Items: The 12th Schedule contains exactly 18 functional items that define the operational jurisdiction of municipalities. These items cover vital urban management responsibilities, including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, public health, sanitation, solid waste management, and the provision of urban amenities like parks and street lighting.
- Role of the State Legislature: It is important to note that the 12th Schedule is not an automatic transfer of power. Article 243W leaves it to the discretion of individual State Legislatures to pass laws devolving these 18 powers and responsibilities to the municipalities. The extent of decentralization thus varies significantly from one state to another.
π Local Government β’ Panchayats
Q.16) The 11th Schedule lists functional items for Panchayats. How many items does it contain?
Ans > 29
- The 73rd Amendment Act: The 11th Schedule was added to the Constitution by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992. This historic legislation sought to realize Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of ‘Gram Swaraj’ by granting constitutional status to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and structuring a three-tier system of rural local self-government.
- Extensive List of Responsibilities: The 11th Schedule is highly comprehensive, containing exactly 29 functional items placed within the purview of Panchayats. These encompass crucial rural development areas such as agriculture, minor irrigation, animal husbandry, rural housing, drinking water, roads, rural electrification, poverty alleviation programs, and primary education.
- Devolution by State Governments: Similar to urban local bodies, the actual transfer of these 29 subjects is contingent upon the respective State Legislatures. Under Article 243G, states are expected to devolve powers and responsibilities to Panchayats to enable them to prepare plans for economic development and social justice based on these 29 enlisted items.
π State Legislature β’ Money Bills
Q.17) What is the maximum period a State Legislative Council can delay a Money Bill sent by the Legislative Assembly?
Ans > 14 days
- Primacy of the Lower House: In the constitutional scheme regarding financial legislation, the directly elected Lower House holds absolute supremacy. A Money Bill can only be introduced in the Legislative Assembly (or the Lok Sabha at the Center), and the Upper House has highly restricted powers to ensure the government is not starved of crucial funds.
- The 14-Day Restraint: Once a Money Bill is passed by the State Legislative Assembly, it is transmitted to the State Legislative Council. The Council must return the bill to the Assembly within a strict maximum period of 14 days. It can only make recommendations; it cannot amend or reject the bill directly.
- Deemed Passage: If the Legislative Council fails to return the bill within the 14-day window, or if the Legislative Assembly completely rejects the Council’s recommendations, the Money Bill is deemed to have been passed by both Houses in the exact form it was originally passed by the Legislative Assembly.
π State Legislature β’ Ordinary Bills
Q.18) What is the absolute maximum period a State Legislative Council can delay an Ordinary Bill in total (combining the first and second instances)?
Ans > 4 months
- Subordinate Role of the Council: Unlike the Rajya Sabha at the central level (which enjoys equal powers with the Lok Sabha regarding ordinary bills), a State Legislative Council is structurally designed to be subordinate to the State Legislative Assembly. It can delay legislation but cannot ultimately veto it.
- First Instance of Delay: When an Ordinary Bill is passed by the Legislative Assembly and sent to the Council for the first time, the Council has three options: pass it, amend it, or reject it. If it rejects the bill, proposes unacceptable amendments, or simply takes no action, it can delay the bill for a maximum of 3 months.
- Second Instance and Finality: If the Assembly passes the bill a second time (with or without the Council’s amendments) and sends it back, the Council’s power is further reduced. In this second instance, it can only delay the bill for a maximum of 1 month. Thus, the absolute total delay power of the Council is merely 4 months (3 + 1).
π State Legislature β’ Joint Sitting
Q.19) Does the Constitution provide for a Joint Sitting of the State Legislature to resolve a deadlock between the Assembly and the Council over an ordinary bill?
Ans > No, there is no provision for a joint sitting in state legislatures; the will of the Assembly ultimately prevails.
- Contrast with the Central Parliament: At the central level, Article 108 of the Constitution provides for a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) to resolve deadlocks over Ordinary or Financial Bills. This is because the Rajya Sabha holds roughly equal legislative footing on these matters.
- Absence in State Legislatures: However, the Constitution deliberately omits any provision for a joint sitting in bicameral State Legislatures. This omission underscores the stark constitutional inferiority of the State Legislative Council. The framers did not want an unelected or indirectly elected upper house to permanently block the directly elected Assembly.
- Ultimate Supremacy of the Assembly: Because there is no joint sitting, deadlocks are structurally impossible at the state level. As explained in the 4-month delay rule, if the Legislative Council rejects a bill twice or delays it beyond the prescribed time, the bill automatically bypasses the Council and is deemed passed by both Houses. The Assembly’s will is absolute.
π Anti-Defection β’ Tenth Schedule
Q.20) Under the Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule), the decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review. Can the courts intervene before the Presiding Officer makes a final decision?
Ans > No, judicial review is available only after the Presiding Officer makes a final decision.
- The Original Law vs. Supreme Court: The Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule) was added by the 52nd Amendment in 1985. Originally, Paragraph 7 of the Schedule explicitly barred the jurisdiction of all courts in matters connected to the disqualification of a member. The Presiding Officerβs decision was intended to be absolutely final.
- The Kihoto Hollohan Judgment (1992): In the landmark Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu case, the Supreme Court struck down Paragraph 7 as unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the Presiding Officer acts as a statutory tribunal while deciding defection cases, and therefore, their decisions are inherently subject to judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court.
- Timing of Judicial Intervention: Crucially, the Supreme Court clarified that this judicial review should generally not intervene prior to the Presiding Officer giving a final decision. Courts cannot grant preliminary injunctions to halt ongoing defection proceedings. Intervention is strictly post-decisional, ensuring that parliamentary autonomy is respected while preserving legal recourse.
π Judiciary β’ Article 323A
Q.21) Article 323A authorizes Parliament to establish Administrative Tribunals. Which landmark Supreme Court judgment (1997) ruled that appeals against the orders of these tribunals shall lie before a division bench of the respective High Court?
Ans > L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
- Creation of Tribunals: The 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976 introduced Part XIV-A to the Constitution, containing Article 323A. This allowed Parliament to establish Administrative Tribunals (like the CAT) to quickly adjudicate disputes regarding the recruitment and conditions of service of public servants, explicitly bypassing the jurisdiction of High Courts to reduce backlog.
- The L. Chandra Kumar Ruling: In 1997, a seven-judge Constitution Bench in the L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India case radically altered this setup. The Supreme Court ruled that the power of judicial review vested in High Courts (Article 226) and the Supreme Court (Article 32) is an unalterable part of the Constitution’s “Basic Structure.”
- Establishing High Court Supremacy: Consequently, the Court struck down the clauses that excluded the jurisdiction of High Courts. It established a new legal framework declaring that all decisions of Administrative Tribunals are subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench (at least two judges) of the respective High Court in whose jurisdiction the Tribunal falls.
π Parliament β’ Office of Profit
Q.22) Under Article 102, a person shall be disqualified from being an MP if they hold an “Office of Profit”. Who decides whether a specific office constitutes an “Office of Profit” that incurs disqualification?
Ans > The Parliament and the Courts
- Constitutional Principle: Article 102(1)(a) disqualifies an MP or MLA from holding an “Office of Profit” under the Central or State government. The underlying logic is to ensure the separation of powers; lawmakers must be free from executive influence or financial inducements, allowing them to discharge their duties with absolute independence.
- Absence of a Constitutional Definition: Surprisingly, neither the Constitution nor the Representation of the People Act (1951) explicitly defines what exactly constitutes an “Office of Profit.” It has been left to interpretation, making it a highly complex and frequently litigated area of constitutional law.
- Role of Parliament and Courts: Parliament possesses the power to pass the “Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,” which explicitly lists specific offices that are exempt from being considered an office of profit. However, for all other undefined offices, the Supreme Court has laid down multiple legal tests over the decades (such as appointment power, remuneration source, and executive control) to interpret and decide the matter on a case-by-case basis.
π Parliament β’ Disqualification
Q.23) Under Article 103, if a question arises as to whether a sitting MP has become subject to disqualification (other than defection), the decision of the President is final. However, the President must act upon the advice of:
Ans > The Election Commission of India
- Scope of Article 103: Article 103 deals with the disqualification of a sitting Member of Parliament for violations outlined in Article 102(1), which includes holding an office of profit, being of unsound mind, being an undischarged insolvent, or losing Indian citizenship. (Note: Disqualification based on defection under the Tenth Schedule is handled separately by the Presiding Officer).
- The President’s Adjudicatory Authority: When a petition or question arises regarding these specific disqualifications, the Constitution vests the final authority to decide the matter in the President of India. The President acts as an adjudicatory body in this specific context rather than exercising pure executive power.
- Mandatory Advice of the ECI: To prevent the ruling political party from misusing this power against opposition MPs, Article 103(2) contains a crucial safeguard. It mandates that before giving any decision, the President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission of India and shall act according to such opinion. The ECI’s advice is completely binding on the President.
π Constitutional Bodies β’ UPSC
Q.24) The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) is the central recruiting agency. Article 320 limits its advisory jurisdiction. For which of the following matters is the UPSC NOT consulted?
Ans > Making reservations of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens
- The UPSC’s Advisory Role: Article 320 of the Constitution outlines the functions of the UPSC. It serves as the paramount “watchdog of merit system” in India. The government is constitutionally required to consult the UPSC on matters like recruitment methods, promotions, transfers, and disciplinary actions against civil servants.
- The Exemption for Social Justice (Article 320(4)): However, the Constitution carefully balances the merit system with the imperatives of social justice. Article 320(4) explicitly states that the UPSC does not need to be consulted while making provisions for the reservation of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens.
- Executive Discretion in Affirmative Action: This exemption ensures that affirmative action policies, which are driven by political and social mandates to uplift marginalized communities (under Article 16(4)), remain the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches. The government designs reservation matrices without requiring the UPSC’s approval, restricting the Commission’s role strictly to the procedural execution of examinations.
π Judiciary β’ Supreme Court Review
Q.25) Which Article grants the Supreme Court the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it?
Ans > Article 137
- Fallibility of the Apex Court: Even the highest court in the land acknowledges the possibility of human error or the emergence of new, crucial facts that were previously unavailable. Recognizing this, the framers included Article 137, breaking away from absolute rigidity to allow for self-correction in the pursuit of justice.
- Power of Review: Article 137 grants the Supreme Court the explicit constitutional power to review any judgment it has pronounced or order it has made. This is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or rules made under Article 145.
- Strict Grounds for Review: A review petition is not an appeal in disguise. The Supreme Court entertains review petitions only on extremely narrow, established grounds. These primarily include the discovery of new and important evidence, a glaring “error apparent on the face of the record,” or any other sufficient reason that fundamentally alters the basis of the original judgment.
π Judiciary β’ Article 139A
Q.26) Under Article 139A, the Supreme Court can withdraw cases pending before High Courts and dispose of them itself. What is the primary condition for doing so?
Ans > The cases must involve the same or substantially the same questions of law of general importance.
- Introduction of Article 139A: Article 139A was introduced into the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act in 1976 and further refined by the 44th Amendment Act in 1978. It was designed to consolidate judicial efficiency and prevent contradictory rulings by different High Courts across the country.
- Condition for Withdrawal: The Supreme Court can utilize this power either on its own motion (suo motu) or upon an application made by the Attorney General of India or a party to the case. The absolute primary condition is that cases pending before one or more High Courts must involve the “same or substantially the same questions of law” of deep general importance.
- Ensuring Legal Uniformity: By withdrawing such cases, the Supreme Court ensures that a definitive, binding constitutional or legal interpretation is provided centrally. This prevents a scenario where the Bombay High Court interprets a central law differently than the Madras High Court, ensuring uniform application of justice across the entire Indian territory.
π Judiciary β’ Res Judicata
Q.27) What does the legal maxim “Res Judicata” imply in Indian constitutional law?
Ans > A matter already judged cannot be pursued further by the same parties.
- Principle of Finality: “Res Judicata” is a foundational Latin maxim in jurisprudence meaning “a matter judged.” It is embodied in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and applies robustly to constitutional law. It establishes the principle that there must be an end to litigation to prevent the endless harassment of parties.
- Preventing Multiplicity of Proceedings: The doctrine implies that once a competent court has finally decided a dispute between two parties on its merits, the exact same issue cannot be raised again in a subsequent lawsuit between the same parties. This prevents judicial gridlock and abuse of the legal system.
- Application in Writ Petitions: In Indian constitutional law, the rule of Res Judicata applies extensively to writ petitions. For instance, if a citizen’s writ petition is dismissed by a High Court after a full hearing on merits, they cannot file a fresh, identical writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32, though they retain the right to formally appeal the High Court’s decision.
π Services β’ Article 312
Q.28) Article 312 empowers the Rajya Sabha to authorize the creation of new All-India Services. What majority is required to pass this resolution?
Ans > Not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting
- Federal Balance and the Rajya Sabha: The creation of an All-India Service (like the IAS, IPS, or IFoS) is a sensitive federal issue because these officers, while recruited and trained by the Central Government, are deployed to serve the State Governments. This impacts state autonomy and administrative control.
- Exclusive Power of the Council of States: Because it represents the interests of the states, the Constitution gives the Rajya Sabha exclusive initiating power under Article 312. Parliament can legally create a new All-India Service only if the Rajya Sabha first passes a resolution declaring that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest to do so.
- The Special Majority Requirement: To ensure that such a significant alteration to the federal administrative structure has broad consensus, the Constitution mandates a special majority. The resolution must be supported by “not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting” in the Rajya Sabha, ensuring robust state-level agreement before Parliament enacts the law.
π States Reorganisation β’ J&K
Q.29) The State of Jammu & Kashmir was officially reorganized into two Union Territories (J&K and Ladakh) with effect from which date?
Ans > October 31, 2019
- The Abrogation of Article 370: On August 5, 2019, the Government of India took the historic step of essentially abrogating Article 370 of the Constitution, which had granted special autonomous status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Following this, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, was rapidly passed by Parliament.
- The Reorganisation Framework: The Act fundamentally restructured the political geography of the region. It dismantled the full-fledged statehood of Jammu and Kashmir, bifurcating it into two separate Union Territories: the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (which retained a legislature) and the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature).
- The Significance of October 31st: While the legislative action occurred in August, the Act officially came into effect on October 31, 2019. This date was heavily symbolic, intentionally chosen because it marks the birth anniversary of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the architect of India’s political integration who unified hundreds of princely states post-independence.
π Amendments β’ Reservations
Q.30) Which Constitutional Amendment extended the reservation of seats for SCs and STs in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies to 2030, while simultaneously ending the nomination of Anglo-Indians?
Ans > 104th Amendment Act (2020)
- The Original 10-Year Sunset Clause: When the Constitution was adopted in 1950, Article 334 mandated that the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, as well as the special representation of the Anglo-Indian community via nomination, would cease after 10 years (i.e., in 1960).
- Continuous Extensions: However, recognizing that the historical disadvantages and social disparities faced by marginalized communities were deeply entrenched, Parliament continuously extended this reservation through successive constitutional amendments (e.g., 8th, 23rd, 45th, 62nd, 79th, and 95th amendments) every decade.
- The Dual Impact of the 104th Amendment: The 104th Constitutional Amendment Act, enacted in January 2020, did two crucial things. First, it extended the reservations for SCs and STs in the legislative bodies for another 10 years, up to January 25, 2030. Second, it conspicuously did not extend the provision for the Anglo-Indian community, effectively abolishing their special nominated representation in Parliament and State Assemblies.
π Quick Summary β Polity Set 196
- Inter-State Council: Established in 1990 acting upon the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations.
- ISC Chairman: The Prime Minister acts as the Chairman of the Inter-State Council.
- Linguistic Minorities: The Special Officer under Article 350B is appointed by the President.
- NCBC Structure: The National Commission for Backward Classes consists of 5 members.
- Rule of Lapse: Unspent funds granted by Parliament expire at the end of the financial year.
- Parking Funds: The PAC considers bypassing the Rule of Lapse as an irregular practice.
- Collective Responsibility: Anchored in Article 75(3) to ensure government accountability to the Lok Sabha.
- Individual Responsibility: Under Article 75(2), ministers hold office during the President’s pleasure, advised by the PM.
- Motion of Thanks: Defeat of this motion implies a vote of no-confidence against the government.
- Privilege Motion: Moved against a minister for withholding facts or breaching the House’s privilege.
- Calling Attention Motion: Exclusively informational; seeks an authoritative statement without censuring the government.
- Zero Hour: An unstructured Indian parliamentary innovation allowing urgent issues without prior notice.
- River Water Disputes: Adjudicated by Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunals under Article 262.
- Tribunal Appointments: Members are nominated by the Chief Justice of India.
- 12th Schedule: Contains 18 functional items for Municipalities.
- 11th Schedule: Contains 29 functional items for Panchayats.
- State Money Bills: Can be delayed by the Legislative Council for a maximum of 14 days.
- State Ordinary Bills: Can be delayed by the Legislative Council for an absolute maximum of 4 months.
- State Joint Sittings: The Constitution does not provide for joint sittings in state legislatures.
- Anti-Defection Review: Courts intervene only after the Presiding Officer makes a final decision.
- Administrative Tribunals: L. Chandra Kumar ruling subjected them to High Court judicial review.
- Office of Profit: Defined and interpreted by Parliament laws and judicial tests.
- MP Disqualification: The President decides on Article 103 issues based on binding ECI advice.
- UPSC Exemptions: Not consulted on affirmative action or backward class reservations.
- Supreme Court Review: Granted power under Article 137 to correct its own judgments.
- Article 139A Withdrawals: Allows SC to take High Court cases involving general questions of law.
- Res Judicata: Legal maxim ensuring finality in judgments and preventing repeated lawsuits.
- All-India Services: Created under Article 312 requiring a 2/3rds majority in the Rajya Sabha.
- J&K Reorganisation: The state was officially bifurcated into UTs on October 31, 2019.
- 104th Amendment: Extended SC/ST reservations to 2030 and ended Anglo-Indian nominations.
Timer β³
15:00
Progress (0/30)
Click any card to flip and reveal the summarized answer!
Smart Review: Questions you got wrong appear here for focused study.